

TRANSFORMING CUSTOMERS INTO CITIZENS: SOME PRELIMINARY LESSONS FROM THE FIELD

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ABSTRACT

The authors argue that the creation of civic capacity requires administrators to expand their repertoire of strategies for cultivating effective citizenship. Traditional models of citizenship perpetuate a false dichotomy between a civic republican tradition that emphasizes substantive agreement through face to face communication and a procedural republic tradition that emphasizes formal rules and processes to ensure access to, and fair treatment in, the public decision making processes. The authors argue that these two citizenship traditions are necessary but not sufficient to make democracy work. Both need to be supplemented by social-capital creating strategies that emphasize institutional knowledge and the skills of brokering and partnering across organizational, jurisdictional, and sectoral boundaries. This hybrid view of citizenship, when combined with our two traditional models, refocuses citizenship away from being ruled toward learning how to rule and the ends this rule is intended to serve.

Citizenship has always been problematic for Americans, largely because our Lockean liberal democratic principles do not provide us with any coherent theory of political obligation. The duties of citizenship always ultimately seem to collapse into some form of instrumental appeal to enlightened self-interest. This Lockean starting point for creating and sustaining a commonly shared sense of purpose and action is increasingly being put to the test by the forces of decentralization, defunding, deregulation, and devolution of government services. These transformative changes have prompted local governments to spend considerable energy and money on citizen envisioning, participation, and co-production processes. In some cases these processes are significantly altering the control and delivery of local services. This is especially happening in community policing and in the restructuring of social service programs for children and families.

These efforts to find new ways of engaging the citizenry are motivated in part by the desire to save money, in part by the need to elicit legitimacy, and in part by a genuine desire to put the citizens more in the driver's seat. But the desire to put the citizens behind the wheels of governance is often confounded by the desire to please. The "customer service" movement is simply a variation on the larger entrepreneurial spirit that has captured the hearts and minds of most local

government jurisdictions as they look for ways to out-source, consolidate, and reinvent service delivery.

Responding to citizens as customers, giving them what they seem to want, does not necessarily produce the kind of community building processes and outcomes that many of the current reforms are designed to accomplish. In fact, concomitantly with these changes, citizens are becoming ever more cynical and unwilling to engage in community-building and other associative activities (Putnam, 1995). Why is this the case and what can be done about it?

This question has been made even more problematic by the "social capital" movement that has done two things to conversations regarding citizenship. First, it has *broadened* the notion of citizenship so that it includes almost any activity that affects the well-being of the community. Engaging in social networking as part of one's normal business activities in the local chamber of commerce gets equated to the service of citizens on a local planning commission or other quasi-governmental advisory boards. Second, the social capital movement has *deepened* the notion of citizenship so that it includes more than just the knowledge and skills necessary to make the formal institutions of government work. It also includes the knowledge and skills necessary to make communities work. The consequence of the social

capital movement is that it has re-opened the old debate as to whether citizenship is about the formal processes of governance or the larger ends that these processes are intended to serve. For these reasons it is useful to start our analysis by recovering the various meanings of citizenship.

THE THEORIES AND PRACTICES OF CITIZENSHIP

Over the past 25 years the authors have participated in more than a dozen citizen participation processes, including task forces, advisory boards, commissions, and street-level encounters to effectuate policy at the operating level. We are struck by the increasing tendency to treat citizens as customers and the ensuing difficulty this poses for developing the kind of knowledge and skills necessary for effective participation in the affairs of community life.

There is little reason to believe this "customer-centered" orientation will soon disappear. In fact, given the culture of our times, we assume it is a necessary starting point for a discussion of citizenship. There are both deep and superficial reasons why this is the case. The superficial reason is that the language and practices of the world of business are overpowering influences in both the public and nonprofit sectors of our lives. There is little reason to suspect that these influences will abate in the decades ahead. A deeper reason for the customer-centered orientation results from the larger conditions of modernity itself. We take seriously the observations of those who argue that modern assumptions about individuality and self-fulfillment, especially when combined with modern technology, disembeds individuals from time and place (Giddens, 1990, especially pp. 17 ff.; Mulgan, 1995). This disembodiedness makes it difficult to create and sustain communities and governance institutions that are time and place bound. Traditional notions of citizenship presuppose some kind of *res publica*, a public table around which citizens can gather to conduct the public's business. The economic, political, civic and technological conditions associated with modernity make the creation of this "public table" both elusive and problematic. (See the Symposium article by Steve Johnson for a more comprehensive account of the role these factors play in undermining democratic citizenship.)

We believe that the creation of this "public table" is made more problematic than it needs to be by perpetuating a false dichotomy between two universes of discourse about what constitutes "good citizenship" (Kemmis, 1990; Bellah, 1985). One is the civic republic tradition that measures citizenship substantively and emphasizes the deliberative and participatory role that each individual plays in constituting a commonly shared sense of purpose and action. A second universe of discourse is the procedural republic tradition which measures citizenship in terms of the formal rules, processes, and structures that create opportunities for access, a fair hearing, rule-bound decision making process, and the right to vote either directly or indirectly for those who make the decisions. The civic republic tradition emphasizes face to face communication, the building of interpersonal trust, and the importance of local knowledge. In contrast, the procedural republic tradition emphasizes the indirect representation of interests, the crucial role of expertise, and the value of mediating processes and structures in achieving the public interest.

In Table I on the next page we have summarized the chief characteristics of these two "good citizenship" traditions. For the civic republic tradition good citizenship is measured by the extent to which each individual in the community is willing and able to sit at a public table and to deliberate with others about what constitutes the public interest. The skills, knowledge and conditions necessary to sustain this kind of conversation are the "stuff of good citizenship". For the procedural republic tradition good citizenship is measured by the extent to which interest groups, associations, and the formal processes of government are able to reflect the interests of the citizenry and the citizenry at large accepts the results of these efforts as legitimate. The requirements of good citizenship under the procedural republic tradition are far less demanding. It is enough that citizens know enough to vote, care enough to pay attention to general, but not specific issues, are tolerant of diverse differences of opinion, and defend the principles of procedural fairness. The burden of democratic governance in the procedural republic model is born by formal institutions and knowledgeable "grass top" citizens rather than by the citizenry at large.

**Table I:
Summary of American Liberal Democratic Citizenship Traditions**

	<u>Civic Republic Tradition</u>	<u>Procedural Republic Tradition</u>
Origins:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • small republic agrarian tradition • civic association • religious communitarianism • Antifederalists 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • nation state • Lockean liberalism • large commercial republic • interest group pluralism • Federalists
Characteristics:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • face to face communication • emphasis on substantive equality • emphasis on substantive agreement and consensus • community is socially constructed • emphasis on importance of place • emphasis on action, i.e., doing things together, rather than getting formal agreement • emphasis on duties over rights 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • reliance on indirect representation • reliance on procedural equality • emphasis on voting and majority rule principle • community is a legal agreement • emphasis on procedural fairness with open access and right to participate • rule of law orientation • emphasis on rights over duties
Citizenship Requirements:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • high level of deliberative skills • development of relevant knowledge and expertise • personal participation • citizen ownership and control of decision 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • voting • heavy reliance on interest group participation • opportunity for individuals to advise and counsel • heavy reliance on elected officials and career administrators
Legitimizing Criteria:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • degree of participation • degree of citizen control • sense of ownership of both process and outcome 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Due notice of important decisions • Opportunity for a "hearing" • Procedural fairness in gather and assessing information.

While these two different ways of thinking about citizenship go a long way in helping us understand the great variety of case studies that we have examined for purposes of this paper, we believe this distinction confounds two different kinds of procedural citizenship. One type, status citizenship, emphasizes equality under the law. Another type, situs citizenship, emphasizes the right of citizens to be protected from bureaucratic abuse and organizational complexity. While both establish procedural rights for citizens in their interactions with institutions of governance, they create quite different expectations for citizens and standards for measuring administrative success in the development of social capital.

Status Citizenship

This is the oldest and most fundamental approach to citizenship in the modern liberal state. It begins with the assumption that individuals are autonomous and free agents who are willing to give up some of their autonomy in exchange for a minimum threshold of equality under the law. It is a way of creating some basic and uniform building blocks out of a multiplicity of private interests (Schaar, 1964, pp. 884 ff.). As agreement on what constitutes relevant equality changes over time, so does one's status as a citizen. This perspective helps us understand the inclusion of previously excluded groups from citizenship status and the expansion over time of what constitutes "equality under the law". To understand what status citizenship means from one jurisdiction to another and from one age to another is essentially a *political* question: What kind of agreement has been reached among the constellation of political forces in society as to what the law should treat as a matter of equality?

Frequently, this larger political question gets lost in discussions of procedural democracy, as if using legalities to trump ones opposition was merely a matter of formalistic jockeying to obtain a procedural advantage. This is not what status citizenship is all about.

Situs Citizenship

Frequently confused with status citizenship, situs citizenship focuses on "where" one is, rather than "who" one is as the basis for determining legal rights. The best examples of situs citizenship emerge from the legal revolution promoted by the Warren Court. During this period the Court extended new rights to prisoners, students, welfare recipient, debtors, etc., not because of

who they were, but because of where they were. All were seen as somewhat helpless, if not intimidated, in the presence of bureaucrats operating on behalf of large complex organizations (Morgan, 1996, pp. 47-49). In these kinds of settings, citizens may require rights and even professional assistance in countering "honest error" or irritable judgment" (Goldberg V. Kelly, 1970, 254, 266, *passim*.).

Situs and status citizenship have much in common. They both equally emphasize rights, adversarial legal tactics, and procedural formalism. They equally de-emphasize discourse and engagement on substantive matters of importance, face-to-face communication, the building of trust over time, and the evolutionary creation of a shared and growing consensus.

There are, however, some important differences that have implications for using administrative discretion to build social capital. Status citizenship emphasizes equality under the law in the political sector, while situs citizenship emphasizes due process, rights of access, and fairness in the *organizational* sector of governance institutions.

Both of these dimensions—the *political and the organizational*—are important for administrators to recognize even when they are seeking to employ the civic engagement model in building social capital. In fact, we believe it is wrong to perpetuate a false dichotomy between the civic and procedural or the status and situs dimensions of citizenship when devising strategies to build social capital.

Our personal experience leads us to conclude that most governance processes are necessarily some mixture of these characteristics of citizenship. This conclusion results from two kinds of practical experience. One of the authors is a "street level bureaucrat" who has spent most of his career interacting with citizens to make public policy work at the implementation stage. The other, because of his academic affiliation, has been called on to serve on a variety of special citizen task forces, boards, and commissions, all of which are advisory to elected officials and/or career administrators. The difference between these two perspectives, not to oversimplify, is the difference between viewing the problem of citizenship from the "grass tops" in comparison to viewing it from the perspective of the "grass bottoms". Many citizen advisory committees are organized around traditional stakeholder principles in which

the "grass tops" are assembled to problem-solve or to work out some kind of compromise that is a "sticky wicket" for elected officials. The skills and knowledge to function in this kind of role are the ones traditionally associated with the procedural republic tradition. On the other hand, when working directly with an already well organized citizenry or one that needs to be organized, the principles of the civic republic tradition need to be put to good use.

Drawing on our experience with more than a dozen different kinds of citizen participation process and the specific case examples that follow, we will provide evidence for our argument and generate some tentative conclusions about the conditions necessary for making each kind of citizenship work. We will conclude with some observations about the implications of our work for future research.

THE OREGON COMMISSION ON CHILD CARE: BUILDING CIVIC CAPACITY THROUGH COLLABORATION AND CONSENSUS-BUILDING

The Oregon Commission on Child Care was created in 1985 to advise the Governor and Legislative Assembly on the care and development of children. The Commission came into being in a policy and program vacuum. The patterns of work and family life were undergoing unprecedented changes as increasing numbers of women entered the workforce. Private, non-profit and public sectors had done little to accommodate the socio-economic changes brought on by working families. Federal support for child care had been eliminated years earlier with the new federalism of the Reagan administration. The resulting cutbacks in Oregon had devastating effects on the infrastructure of community-based programs for children.

The Commission was designed to be an independent voice, broadly representative of child care interests. The Governor, Speaker of the House and Senate President each had individual responsibility for appointing a share of the 21 Commission members. The membership included child care providers, employers, local government, tax and benefits attorneys, child development specialists and pediatricians, parents and women. The Commission had a very broad charge, little or no staff or budget resources and no lead state agency to shape or control their deliberations.

The Commission's collective orientation was community-based and private. Its efforts were guided by a governing belief that child care was a community-based problem to be solved by a coordinated and complementary partnership of state and local, private and public initiatives. Commissioners believed that no one player could act alone to produce a lasting solution to the complex social, economic and developmental issues involved in child care. Rather than seek a dominate state agency to plan and control child care programs, the Commission pursued a strategy of knitting together networks of diverse partners to make lasting improvements to child care services. During its first five years, the Commission promoted a statewide dialogue among state agencies and local interest groups. Around their "public table", the Commission developed a consensus of support for a comprehensive child care agenda. By keeping the dialogue open and inclusive, and insisting on broad consensus, the Commission developed trust among the diverse participants. The Commission used community meetings and statewide conferences to extend its network and deepened its roots around the state.

The Commission's work cycle centered on biennial legislative sessions. In the off years, Commission members worked on specific elements of the comprehensive agenda, gathering information from communities. In the legislative years, the Commission gathered together the various components of its network, developed consensus around legislative initiatives and managed a statewide lobbying effort to move specific legislation. These cycles allowed the Commission to focus alternatively on the local and statewide elements of its comprehensive agenda, continually building connections and communications between the two.

The Commission's strategy proved very successful during its formative years. Between 1985 and 1990, Oregon enacted family leave legislation, established a Child Care Coordinator and a coordinating council of state agencies, made the initial investments in a statewide system of community-based resource and referral agencies, and granted tax credits for business investments in child care. These practical successes built trust among Commission partners, and deepened the reach and voice of private and non-profit organizations. More importantly, the Commission established the common ground for a new and productive discussion with state agencies about the most effective role for government in the child care agenda.

The Commission avoided the common fate of advisory bodies by using the "public table" to educate and engage state agencies and interest groups in a process of consensus-building. Rather than becoming an impotent mouthpiece for its various special interests, the Commission became a nexus of public discourse, planning and action, encouraging widespread development of community-based strategies. In five short years, the Commission helped create a civic infrastructure that made productive change possible in state government and in communities throughout Oregon.

In 1990, the Commission faced a critical test of its guiding principles and evolving statewide network. Congress had enacted sweeping child care legislation that included significant new child care block grants. Each state was charged with the responsibility of establishing a lead agency and submitting a block grant plan. For many child care advocates, the new federal investments were both a blessing and a curse. While the state and local communities desperately needed public funding, no one in Oregon wanted to return to the divisive and destructive competition that characterized the last round of federal child care funding prior to 1980. For the Commission, the new planning process was a test of the partnerships that had been formed between state agencies and local communities, and the collaborative principles that guided the statewide child care network.

During a tumultuous twelve months, the Commission's network held firm to its principles of collaboration, consensus and community. Commissioners used their network of local partners to lobby the Governor and state agencies for a broad and inclusive public planning process, with shared ownership by the state's lead agency and the community-based organizations. The network helped lobby to protect the block grant plan from tinkering by executive and legislative interests. And in the eleventh hour of the legislative session, the network played a critical role in turning back an attempt to break open the block grant by the Speaker of the Oregon House. The Commission's investment in a civic infrastructure for child care made the success of the 1990 block grant plan possible. By asserting itself in 1990, the Commission and its many diverse partners established a new and powerful paradigm for public policy in Oregon based on a shared vision and shared responsibilities to achieve practical and measurable improvements in the lives of Oregon's children and working families.

In retrospect, the Commission employed a paradoxical strategy of "engagement" designed to produce a "procedurally competent" citizenry. The widely diverse and dispersed elements of the child care network were disengaged and disenfranchised when the Commission was created in 1985. Through the use of local, regional and statewide discussions, the Commission promoted the direct involvement of advocates, parents, providers and a host of other interests in the development of a broad-based child care agenda. Once educated and motivated, the Commission organized and mobilized these new citizens into an effective force in the procedural world of legislation and budgets. The Commission's continuing success or failure remains dependent on its dedication to balancing the direct engagement of its civic strategies with the representational and rights-based procedural strategies.

THE MID-COUNTY SEWER PROJECT: A CLASSIC FAILURE OF PUBLIC PROCEDURE

Mid-Multnomah County is an area comprising 22,300 acres of land, a resident population in excess of 166,000 people and nearly 65,000 households. In 1985, the Mid-County area was predominately unincorporated and unserved by sanitary sewer systems. Homes, business, hospitals and public buildings discharged more than 14 million gallons of untreated sewage per day into the ground. For more than 40 years, Multnomah County had encouraged the urbanization of Mid-County without the prerequisite infrastructure that was commonplace for modern urban and suburban development.

In 1972, Congress passed the Clean Water Act, the most comprehensive environmental legislation in more than a generation. The Oregon Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) was charged with administration of the Act, and local jurisdictions were required to develop plans to insure protection of water resources. Throughout the 1970s and early 1980s, the DEQ, Multnomah County and the cities of Portland and Gresham participated in water resource planning that identified threats to water quality and proposed actions to eliminate the known sources of pollution. In addition, the DEQ and local governments began testing water wells to determine the current condition and potential pollution of groundwater resources.

By 1982, state and local officials had sufficient research to document increasing pollution of groundwater resources under Mid-County. The studies identified

cesspools and seepage pits as the primary cause. The Oregon Environmental Quality Commission (EQC) ordered Multnomah County and the cities of Portland and Gresham to submit plans to install sanitary sewer systems. Furthermore, the EQC directed that, effective January 1, 1985, all new development in the affected areas must be connected to a sanitary sewer system.

The EQC and the local governments used a traditional public process for developing plans to provide sanitary sewer systems in Mid-County. The governments hired experts, commissioned studies, gathered public opinion surveys and logged hundreds of hours of public hearings and meetings during four years of study, discussion and debate. The combined efforts culminated in a 1986 EQC order directing the cities of Portland and Gresham to construct sewers to serve Mid-County, and directing property owners to connect to sewer systems within one year of their construction. The EQC order set 2005 as the final deadline for its sewer connection mandate.

Once the EQC order took effect, Portland and Gresham began an aggressive construction schedule to expand sewer treatment facilities, extend sewer trunk lines, locate pump stations and construct hundreds of miles of sewer collector lines and laterals. Their construction plans uprooted the very fabric of established neighborhoods, altered traffic patterns and filled homes and businesses with the grit and dust that comes with excavation work. Their financing plans relied on special assessments and connection fees imposed on homeowners, businesses, churches, schools, parks and every other type of real property. Except for a small amount of federal grants for major facilities, the overwhelming majority of the \$362 million project fell on property owners to pay or finance, at an average cost of \$4,100 per household.

Sewer construction in the Portland service area continued without delay for 3 years. By 1989, the major sewer treatment and transportation facilities were in place and work had begun in residential neighborhoods and commercial centers. The City had assessed several thousand property owners for the costs of the sewers, and was soliciting bids for the next round of sewer collection systems. Each new project area brought a thousand more property owners face to face with the dislocation of construction and the burden of sewer charges.

Beginning in 1989, the City began to track increases in sewer construction bids caused by competition from a revitalized regional economy. The rising construction costs raised serious concerns among project managers. For 8 months, the City placed a hold on new construction contracts in order to study the causes of the cost increases and consider new financing strategies. During the same period, a community group began to organize property owners in Mid-County to lobby for wholesale reductions in the costs of the new sewers. The Portland Organizing Project's message was simple, powerful and well received by property owners who had felt disenfranchised by Multnomah County and exploited by the City of Portland.

Between 1989 and 1991, the Portland Organizing Project (POP) managed an effective campaign to change the financing structure of the sewer project. Using aggressive and confrontational tactics, POP turned public meetings and hearings into opportunities to make demands and extract specific commitments from elected officials and project managers. POP threw out the rules of procedural government and ushered in a new kind of politics that had never been seen before in Portland. The City of Portland's response was slow, defensive and ineffective. The City appointed a special citizen's task force to study the problem and make recommendations, but it was unable to find an effective middle ground between POP and the City. There were growing disagreements between professional staff and elected officials about the most effect and affordable solutions to the popular uprising.

In the spring of 1992, the Portland City Council brought the sewer dilemma to a conclusion through a series of public hearing at City Hall. The process was organized and managed by the City commissioner who was directly responsible for managing the sewer project. The hearing and Council deliberations were conducted in front of television cameras, with POP's organized army of protesters overflowing the Council Chambers. The Council met at least five times in three months to hammer out a new financing strategy for Mid-County and finally settled on a series of grants, credits and deferrals that would cost an estimated \$88 million. In short, the elected officials took over responsibility for problem-solving rather than rely on career administrators and citizen advisory bodies, as it had done in the past.

Traditional procedural methods failed in Mid-County because the affected property owners never believed they were properly represented in the original EQC hearings that were conducted in 1985 and 1986, nor by the City Council in its managing of the sewer project between 1986 and 1992. The sewer project became a political symbol for the disenfranchisement felt by property owners in Mid-County. Denied any opportunity to incorporate as a separate municipality, property owners resisted annexation to either Portland or Gresham. Without active participation by Multnomah County, most property owners in Mid-County had no elected officials directly representing their interests. Standing on the outside of the decision-making process, Mid-County was poised to follow any organized political force that could give effective voice to their complaints and fears. The Portland Organizing Project became their blunt instrument for influencing public decisions that directly affected their homes and livelihoods.

The lessons of the Mid-County Sewer Project have broad implications for the multiplicity of governance activities that rely exclusively on the procedural traditions to build effective citizenship. It is risky for governance institutions to rely so heavily on process without investing in the citizenship-building to make such systems work effectively. Process requires citizens (not customers). Citizenship requires knowledge of the issues, recognition of rights and responsibilities, and organization to advance desired outcomes. Understanding and organizations require considerable time to develop and they grow out of the artful application of civic principles of engagement. Throughout the early history of Mid-County, the responsible governance institutions worked in subtle ways to avoid civic engagement for fear of the political opposition that may result. Portland's strategy promoted status citizenship principles by focusing on broad-based equity arguments to support and defend programs and policies. While the strategy bought the City some time to get the project underway, it proved completely ineffective in preventing the Portland Organizing Project from building effective political opposition based on *situs* citizenship arguments.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The case studies summarized above demonstrate the need to draw more careful distinctions than has been customary in the variety and modes of citizenship. Rather than pit face-to-face democracy against more indirect and rule-centered governance processes that are

procedural and advisory in orientation, we need to think of the requirements of citizenship in much more diverse and robust terms. As the case studies demonstrate, citizenship requires the following repertoire of knowledge, skills and behavior:

1. Representation and traditional interest-based mobilization of opinion - In cases where there is a clearly articulated collection of interests that are not being adequately addressed, representation and traditional political lobbying efforts become one of the most effective tools of citizenship engagement. As the Mid-County Sewer Project demonstrates, sustained mobilization efforts of this kind can shift the locus of decision-making responsibility and redefine the situation for action. This kind of citizenship presupposes an initial clarity of purpose. It presupposes a reasonably sophisticated understanding of complex administrative and political processes, at least by the leadership cadre of the organization, and it presupposes the capacity of this leadership cadre to sustain citizen interest in collective action.

2. Consensus-Based Techniques - In instances where clarity of purpose and action do not exist, then the construction of a social agreement is essential for success. The experience of the Oregon Child Care Commission demonstrates the remarkable success that a consensus-building process can have outside the formal institutions of governance and the degree of influence this consensus-building process can have in fundamentally altering public policy. As the two cases demonstrate, consensus sufficient to define the situation for action is an essential precondition for successful civic involvement.

3. Rule-Centered Approaches - The two case studies presented above have one overriding characteristic in common. They all demonstrate the need for citizens to understand the "rules of the game" and know what set of rules apply under which set of circumstances. For example, the Oregon Child Care Commission used the rules governing the two-year state funding and legislative cycles as a key consideration in organizing its consensus-building strategy. Members of the Commission understood the rules governing the state legislative agenda and turned this knowledge into a set of constraints on its own members to develop a disciplined strategy for altering state policy. By contrast, the citizens of Mid-County needed the intervention of an outside political force, the Portland Organizing Project,

to bring the necessary procedural knowledge and organizing discipline to effect substantive changes in city policies and programs. Without these fundamental skills, political discontent over mandatory sewers may have remained dispersed and ineffectual for the remaining life of the project.

4. Brokering, Networking and Partnering - The Oregon Child Care Commission demonstrates the vital importance of the civic skills of brokering, networking and partnering. These are quite sophisticated skills, requiring "insider" knowledge of how things really work, timing, and intersectoral understanding that may well be beyond the repertoire of the average citizen. But it is precisely these skills that are likely to become more important as a result of the forces of change brought on by defunding, deregulation, devolution of government services, and decentralization. For lack of a better term we have labeled this new kind of citizenship "hybrid", precisely because it spans both the civic and procedural republic traditions of citizenship.

The Oregon Commission on Child Care is a good example of what we mean by hybrid citizenship. It required the participants to build trust through extensive face-to-face communication, but the trust-building activity was undertaken by "grass-top" citizen leaders who constructed a social agreement that had to be translated into action through a multitude of formal and informal institutions of governance at the state and local levels. In order to make this kind of citizenship work the participants had to acquire the new skills of brokering and partnering with participants in the public, private and nonprofit sectors. Success required a subtle understanding of interorganizational, interjurisdictional and intergovernmental dynamics. One had to become a jack-of-all trades; one needed to build trust slowly over time; one had to mobilize individuals to act, even when they may be in disagreement; one needed to understand the legal parameters of collective action, especially when it required the cooperation of multiple public, private and nonprofit partners; one needed to know how to transform organizational support into institutional longevity. In short, hybrid citizenship requires knowledge of community-building, which presupposes a knowledge of the whole as well as the individual parts. Defined in this way, citizenship becomes indistinguishable from governing. As with the current social capital debate, it is difficult to make much sense out of either the procedural or civic glue that binds a community together without considering the ends that these processes of governance

are intended to serve.

We have summarized in Table II (next page) what we have learned from more than a dozen different types of citizen participation processes that we have been involved in over the past twenty years. It includes both civic and procedural republic traditions of citizenship as well as the hybrid variety that has been spawned by recent government-limiting activities. It is our belief that citizenship requires knowing what kinds of knowledge, skills and behavior are required in different sets of circumstances (Schmidt, 1992; Schön, 1983).

QUESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

This paper raises several questions that are worthy of additional research. Most of these questions involve empirically testing the assumptions underlying different types of citizenship we have identified in this paper, especially the connection between acts of different forms of civic involvement and the development of social capital.

1. What is the impact of various kinds of citizen involvement activity on the individuals who participate? Do they become more involved in other settings, and, if so, how are their attitudes and behaviors altered?
2. What is the impact of high levels of civic involvement on the functioning of the formal institutions of governance? For example, we have witnessed instances where heightened levels of civic engagement in a neighborhood have been turned against the substantive policy objectives and procedures of the formal institutions of governance.
3. What is the best way to educate citizens in the different modes of citizen participation and what is required to make each mode function effective?
4. What are the consequences of each kind of citizen involvement for the development of social capital?

Taken together these questions test the popular assumption that the civic republic tradition of citizenship is superior to the procedural republic tradition. While they are clearly different, we are not certain that one tradition is superior to the other. Both, in fact, may be insufficient but equally essential to enhancing social capital and making democratic governance work.

Table II: Modes and Varieties of Citizenship

Types of Organized Activity

	Voluntary Associations	Citizen Com-missions	Citizen Task Forces	Citizen Advisory Boards	Formal Neighborhood As-sociations	Co-production
1. Civic Republic						
• trust-building activities	X	X	Within Group	Within Group	X	X
• face-to-face communication.	X	X	Within Group	Within Group	X	X
• undertaking common "barn-raising" action	X	X			X	X
• participatory decision-making	X	X			X	X
2. Procedural Republic						
• establishing agreed-upon rules		X	X	X		X
• Advisory		X	X	X		X
• Reliance on experts		X	X	X		X
3. Hybrid Citizenship						
• brokering		X			X	X
• partnering		X			X	X
• intergovernmental, interorganizational, intersectoral		X			X	X
• institutional knowledge		X			X	X

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